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The increasing ascendancy of real business cycle 
theories of various stripes, with their common view that 
the economy is best modeled as a floating Walrasian 
equilibrium, buffeted by productivity shocks, is indica-
tive of the depths of the divisions separating academic 
macroeconomists. These theories deny propositions 
thought self-evident by many academic macroecono-
mists and all of those involved in forecasting and con-
trolling the economy on a day-to-day basis. They assert 
that monetary policies have no effect on real activity, 
that fiscal policies influence the economy only through 
their incentive effects, and that economic fluctuations 
are caused entirely by supply rather than demand 
shocks. 
If these theories are correct, they imply that the mac-
roeconomics developed in the wake of the Keynes-
ian Revolution is well confined to the ashbin of history. 
And they suggest that most of the work of contempo-
rary macroeconomists is worth little more than that of 
those pursuing astrological science. According to the 
views espoused by enthusiastic proponents of real busi-
ness cycle theories, astrology and Keynesian economics 
are in many ways similar: both lack scientific support, 
both are premised on the relevance of variables that are 
in fact irrelevant, both are built on a superstructure of 
nonoperational and ill-defined concepts, and both are 
harmless only when they are ineffectual. 
The appearance of Ed Prescott's stimulating paper, 
"Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement," 
affords an opportunity to assess the current state of real 
business cycle theory and to consider its prospects as a 
foundation for macroeconomic analysis. Prescott's pa-
per is brilliant in highlighting the appeal of real business 
cycle theories and making clear the assumptions they 
require. But he does not make much effort at caution in 
judging the potential of the real business cycle para-
digm. He writes that "if the economy did not display the 
business cycle phenomena, there would be a puzzle," 
characterizes without qualification economic fluctua-
tions as "optimal responses to uncertainty in the rate of 
technological change," and offers the policy advice that 
"costly efforts at stabilization are likely to be counter-
productive." 
Prescott's interpretation of his title is revealing of his 
commitment to his theory. He does not interpret the 
phrase theory ahead of measurement to mean that we 
lack the data or measurements necessary to test his 
theory. Rather, he means that measurement techniques 
have not yet progressed to the point where they fully 
corroborate his theory. Thus, Prescott speaks of the key 
deviation of observation from theory as follows: "An 
important part of this deviation could very well disap-
pear if the economic variables were measured more in 
conformity with theory. That is why I argue that theory 
is now ahead of business cycle measurement " 
The claims of real business cycle theorists deserve 
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23 serious assessment, especially given their source and 
their increasing influence within the economics profes-
sion. Let me follow Prescott in being blunt. My view is 
that real business cycle models of the type urged on us 
by Prescott have nothing to do with the business cycle 
phenomena observed in the United States or other capi-
talist economies. Nothing in Prescott's papers or those 
he references is convincing evidence to the contrary. 
Before turning to the argument Prescott presents, let 
me offer one lesson from the history of science. 
Extremely bad theories can predict remarkably well. 
Ptolemaic astronomy guided ships and scheduled har-
vests for two centuries. It provided extremely accurate 
predictions regarding a host of celestial phenomena. 
And to those who developed it, the idea that the earth 
was at the center seemed an absolutely natural starting 
place for a theory. So, too, Lamarckian biology, with its 
emphasis on the inheritance of acquired characteristics, 
successfully predicted much of what was observed in 
studies of animals and plants. Many theories can 
approximately mimic any given set of facts; that one 
theory can does not mean that it is even close to right. 
Prescott's argument takes the form of the construc-
tion of an artificial economy which mimics many of the 
properties of actual economies. The close coincidence 
of his model economy and the actual economy leads 
him to conclude that the model economy is a reasonable 
if abstract representation of the actual economy. This 
claim is bolstered by the argument that the model econo-
my is not constructed to fit cyclical facts but is parame-
terized on the basis of microeconomic information and 
the economy's long-run properties. Prescott's argument 
is unpersuasive at four levels. 
Are the Parameters Right? 
First, Prescott's claim to have parameterized the model 
on the basis of well-established microeconomic and 
long-run information is not sustainable. As one exam-
ple, consider a parameter which Prescott identifies as 
being important in determining the properties of the 
model, the share of household time devoted to market 
activities. He claims that is one-third. Data on its aver-
age value over the last century indicate, as Martin 
Eichenbaum, Lars Hansen, and Kenneth Singleton 
(1986) have noted, an average value of one-sixth over 
the past 30 years. This seems right—a little more than 
half the adult population works, and those who work 
work about a quarter of the time. I am unable to find 
evidence supporting Prescott's one-third figure in the 
cited book by Gilbert Ghez and Gary Becker (1975). To 
take another example, Prescott takes the average real 
interest rate to be 4 percent. Over the 30-year period he 
studies, it in fact averaged only about 1 percent. This list 
of model parameters chosen somewhat arbitrarily 
could be easily extended. 
A more fundamental problem lies in Prescott's 
assumption about the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution in labor supply. He cites no direct microeco-
nomic evidence on this parameter, which is central to 
his model of cyclical fluctuations. Nor does he refer to 
any aggregate evidence on it. Rather, he relies on a 
rather selective reading of the evidence on the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption in 
evaluating the labor supply elasticity. My own reading 
is that essentially all the available evidence suggests 
only a minimal response of labor to transitory wage 
changes. Many studies (including Altonji 1982; 
Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers 1985; and Eichen-
baum, Hansen, and Singleton 1986) suggest that the 
intertemporal substitution model cannot account at 
either the micro or the macro level for fluctuations in la-
bor supply. 
Prescott is fond of parameterizing models based on 
long-run information. Japan has for 30 years enjoyed 
real wage growth at a rate four times the U.S. rate, close 
to 8 percent. His utility function would predict that such 
rapid real wage growth would lead to a much lower 
level of labor supply by the representative consumer. I 
am not aware that this pattern is observed in the data. 
Nor am I aware of data suggesting that age/hours pro-
files are steeper in professions like medicine or law, 
where salaries rise rapidly with age. 
Prescott's growth model is not an inconceivable 
representation of reality. But to claim that its parame-
ters are securely tied down by growth and micro obser-
vations seems to me a gross overstatement. The image 
of a big loose tent flapping in the wind comes to mind. 
Where Are the Shocks? 
My second fundamental objection to Prescott's model 
is the absence of any independent corroborating evi-
dence for the existence of what he calls technological 
shocks. This point is obviously crucial since Prescott 
treats technological shocks as the only driving force 
behind cyclical fluctuations. Prescott interprets all 
movements in measured total factor productivity as 
being the result of technology shocks or to a small 
extent measurement error. He provides no discussion of 
the source or nature of these shocks, nor does he cite 
any microeconomic evidence for their importance. I 
suspect that the vast majority of what Prescott labels 
technology shocks are in fact the observable concomi-
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tants of labor hoarding and other behavior which 
Prescott does not allow in his model. 
Two observations support this judgment. First, it's 
hard to find direct evidence of the existence of large 
technological shocks. Consider the oil shocks, certainly 
the most widely noted and commented on shocks of the 
postwar period. How much might they have been 
expected to reduce total factor productivity? In one of 
the most careful studies of this issue, Ernst Berndt 
(1980, p. 85) concludes that "energy price or quantity 
variations since 1973 do not appear to have had a 
significant direct role in the slowdown of aggregate 
labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing, 1973-77." 
This is not to deny that energy shocks have important 
effects. But they have not accounted for large move-
ments in measured total factor productivity. 
Prescott assumes that technological changes are 
irregular, but is unable to suggest any specific techno-
logical shocks which presage the downturns that have 
actually taken place. A reasonable challenge to his 
model is to ask how it accounts for the 1982 recession, 
the most serious downturn of the postwar period. More 
generally, it seems to me that the finding that measured 
productivity frequently declines is difficult to account 
for technologically. What are the sources of technical 
regress? Between 1973 and 1977, for example, both 
mining and construction displayed negative rates of 
productivity growth. For smaller sectors of the econo-
my, negative productivity growth is commonly ob-
served. 
A second observation casting doubt on Prescott's 
assumed driving force is that while technological 
shocks leading to changes in total factor productivity 
are hard to find, other explanations are easy to support. 
Jon Fay and James Medoff (1985) surveyed some 170 
firms on their response to downturns in the demand for 
their output. The questions asked were phrased to make 
clear that it was exogenous downturns in their output 
that were being inquired about. Fay and Medoff (1985, 
p. 653) summarize their results by stating that "the 
evidence indicates that a sizeable portion of the swings 
in productivity over the business cycle is, in fact, the 
result of firms' decisions to hold labor in excess of 
regular production requirements and to hoard labor." 
According to their data, the typical plant in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector paid for 8 percent more blue-
collar hours than were needed for regular production 
work during the trough quarter of its most recent down-
turn. After taking account of the amount of other 
worthwhile work that was completed by blue-collar 
employees during the trough quarter, 4 percent of the 
blue-collar hours paid for were hoarded. Similar con-
clusions have been reached in every other examination 
of microeconomic data on productivity that I am aware 
of. 
In Prescott's model, the central driving force behind 
cyclical fluctuations is technological shocks. The propa-
gation mechanism is intertemporal substitution in em-
ployment. As I have argued so far, there is no inde-
pendent evidence from any source for either of these 
phenomena. 
What About Prices? ... 
My third fundamental objection to Prescott's argument 
is that he does price-free economic analysis. Imagine an 
analyst confronting the market for ketchup. Suppose 
she or he decided to ignore data on the price of ketchup. 
This would considerably increase the analyst's freedom 
in accounting for fluctuations in the quantity of ketchup 
purchased. Indeed, without looking at the price of ketch-
up, it would be impossible to distinguish supply shocks 
from demand shocks. It is difficult to believe that any 
explanation of fluctuations in ketchup sales that did not 
confront price data would be taken seriously, at least by 
hard-headed economists. 
Yet Prescott offers us an exercise in price-free eco-
nomics. While real wages, interest rates, and returns to 
capital are central variables in his model, he never looks 
at any data on them except for his misconstrual of the 
average real interest rate over the postwar period. Oth-
ers have confronted models like Prescott's to data on 
prices with what I think can fairly be labeled dismal 
results. There is simply no evidence to support any of 
the price effects predicted by the model. Prescott's work 
does not resolve—or even mention—the empirical real-
ity emphasized by Robert Barro and Robert King 
(1982) that consumption and leisure move in opposite 
directions over the business cycle with no apparent 
procyclicality of real wages. It is finessed by ignoring 
wage data. Prescott's own work with Rajnish Mehra 
(1985) indicates that the asset pricing implications of 
models like the one he considers here are decisively 
rejected by nearly 100 years of historical experience. I 
simply do not understand how an economic model can 
be said to have been tested without price data. 
I believe that the preceding arguments demonstrate 
that real business cycle models of the type surveyed by 
Prescott do not provide a convincing account of cycli-
cal fluctuations. Even if this strong proposition is not 
accepted, they suggest that there is room for factors 
other than productivity shocks as causal elements in 
cyclical fluctuations. 
25 ... And Exchange Failures? 
A fourth fundamental objection to Prescott's work is 
that it ignores the fact that partial breakdowns in the 
exchange mechanism are almost surely dominant fac-
tors in cyclical fluctuations. Consider two examples. 
Between 1929 and 1933, the gross national product in 
the United States declined 50 percent, as employment 
fell sharply. In Europe today, employment has not risen 
since 1970 and unemployment has risen more than 
fivefold in many countries. I submit that it defies credu-
lity to account for movements on this scale by pointing 
to intertemporal substitution and productivity shocks. 
All the more given that total factor productivity has 
increased more than twice as rapidly in Europe as in the 
United States. 
If some other force is responsible for the largest 
fluctuations that we observe, it seems quixotic method-
ologically to assume that it plays no role at all in other 
smaller fluctuations. Whatever mechanisms may have 
had something to do with the depression of the 1930s in 
the United States or the depression today in Europe 
presumably have at least some role in recent American 
cyclical fluctuations. 
What are those mechanisms? We do not yet know. 
But it seems clear that a central aspect of depressions, 
and probably economic fluctuations more generally, is 
a breakdown of the exchange mechanism. Read any 
account of life during the Great Depression in the 
United States. Firms had output they wanted to sell. 
Workers wanted to exchange their labor for it. But the 
exchanges did not take place. To say the situation was 
constrained Pareto optimal given the technological 
decline that took place between 1929 and 1933 is 
simply absurd, even though total factor productivity did 
fall. What happened was a failure of the exchange 
mechanism. This is something that no model, no matter 
how elaborate, of a long-lived Robinson Crusoe dealing 
with his changing world is going to confront. A model 
that embodies exchange is a minimum prerequisite for 
a serious theory of economic downturns. 
The traditional Keynesian approach is to postulate 
that the exchange mechanism fails because prices are in 
some sense rigid, so they do not attain market-clearing 
levels and thereby frustrate exchange. This is far from 
being a satisfactory story. Most plausible reasons why 
prices might not change also imply that agents should 
not continue to act along static demand and supply 
curves. But it hardly follows that ignoring exchange 
failures because we do not yet fully understand them is 
a plausible strategy. 
Where should one look for failures of the exchange 
process? Convincing evidence of the types of mecha-
nisms that can lead to breakdowns of the exchange 
mechanism comes from analyses of breakdowns in 
credit markets. These seem to have played a crucial role 
in each of the postwar recessions. Indeed, while it is 
hard to account for postwar business cycle history by 
pointing to technological shocks, the account offered 
by, for example, Otto Eckstein and Allen Sinai (1986) 
of how each of the major recessions was caused by a 
credit crunch in an effort to control inflation seems 
compelling to me. 
Conclusion 
Even at this late date, economists are much better at 
analyzing the optimal response of a single economic 
agent to changing conditions than they are at analyzing 
the equilibria that will result when diverse agents inter-
act. This unfortunate truth helps to explain why macro-
economics has found the task of controlling, predicting, 
or even explaining economic fluctuations so difficult. 
Improvement in the track record of macroeconomics 
will require the development of theories that can ex-
plain why exchange sometimes works well and other 
times breaks down. Nothing could be more counterpro-
ductive in this regard than a lengthy professional detour 
into the analysis of stochastic Robinson Crusoes. 
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